Why Manipur’s ‘Territorial Integrity’ Remains A Risky Narrative
(ANALYSIS) In his resignation letter, former Manipur Chief Minister N. Biren Singh urged the Central government to protect the state’s “territorial integrity.” And then days after President’s Rule was imposed, his BJP colleague Sambit Patra gave the same assurance. Both politicians seem to have ignored the risks of refusing to consider state reorganization, which is not the same as separatism.
In international law, territorial integrity would mean a country’s right to “sovereignty” over its entire territory, prohibiting external interference or attempts to alter its borders. In Manipur, the term refers to preserving the territory of the state as it existed at the end of the British Raj in 1947.
Protecting a state’s “territorial integrity” is largely a political concern with little constitutional basis. In Manipur, the only state currently using this term, it reflects the concerns of the majority Meitei community, which makes up about 53% of the population.
Leading the territorial integrity narrative is COCOMI. It stands for the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity, a civil society umbrella group that opposes the current demands of the minority Kuki-Zo tribal community for state reorganisation and previously resisted similar demands from the Naga tribal community.
Therefore, Patra, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) parliamentarian representing a constituency in Odisha, sounded like COCOMI when he told ANI: “As far as the BJP is concerned, we are committed to … maintaining the territorial integrity of Manipur.”
COCOMI
COCOMI was established in 2019 in response to concerns over the Naga peace talks between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM, which many in Manipur feared could alter the state’s territorial boundaries to accommodate Naga demands for a “Greater Nagaland” or “Nagalim.”
The Naga demands at the time pertained to hill districts such as Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati and Chandel — areas distinct from the Meitei-majority regions of the Imphal Valley. Similarly, the Kuki-Zo demand for a Union Territory with a legislature, as a response to ongoing violent ethnic tensions, concerns areas where they live and already have a degree of autonomy.
As we may know, Manipur’s valley region, which serves as the state’s economic and political hub, has been predominantly inhabited by the Meitei community. The surrounding hill areas are home to the Kuki-Zo and Naga communities, each with distinct traditions and governance systems.
The insistence on maintaining “territorial integrity” may suggest that the existing territory was historically unified, but that is apparently not the case.
Manipur’s history
Before British rule, Manipur was an independent princely state ruled by the Meitei kings, with the Kangla Fort in Imphal as its political centre. However, the territory of the Meitei kingdom was historically limited to the Imphal Valley, while the surrounding hill areas, inhabited by Naga and Kuki-Zo tribes, were largely autonomous and not under direct Meitei control.
During the colonial rule, Manipur became a princely state under British suzerainty after the Anglo-Manipur War of 1891. The British administered the hill areas separately from the Meitei-dominated valley under an “Excluded Areas” policy, recognising that the tribal regions had their own chieftainship-based governance. The Kukis, for instance, had an independent socio-political structure under hereditary chiefs, and the Nagas also had a distinct tribal system.
After the 1947 independence and until 1949, Manipur had an elected assembly under a democratic constitution. Under the Manipur State Constitution Act of 1947, the hill areas were integrated into the state’s political framework for the first time. The Act established a State Assembly with a total of 53 seats, allocating 18 seats specifically to representatives from the hill regions. Matters specifically concerning the hill areas were addressed through the Manipur State Hill (Administration) Regulation of 1947, which reserved certain powers for local authorities in the hills.
In 1949, Manipur became part of India after its Maharaja, Bodhachandra Singh, signed the Merger Agreement with the Government of India. The Maharaja was allegedly pressured by the Indian government into signing the Instrument of Accession, according to some accounts, a claim New Delhi has denied.
From 1949 to 1956, Manipur was a “Part C” state under direct control of the Government of India, under Article 239 of the Indian Constitution. It was a Union Territory from 1956 to 1972, when it attained full statehood. For Manipur’s transition to full statehood, Article 371C was introduced through the 27th Amendment Act of 1971.
This Article provided for special provisions concerning the administration of the state’s hill areas, based on which the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act of 1971 was enacted, establishing six Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the hill regions.
These councils were intended to facilitate self-governance and address the specific needs of the tribal communities. They were empowered to manage local affairs, including matters related to land, resources and cultural practices.
Article 371C also empowers the President of India to establish a separate committee within the Manipur Legislative Assembly, consisting of members elected from the Hill Areas. The Governor of Manipur is given a special responsibility to oversee its functioning and must submit annual reports to the President on the administration of the Hill Areas.
Territorial reorganization
This suggests that, in theory, the case for a separate administration for the Kuki-Zo hill areas may be stronger than previous state bifurcations in the country, such as Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, Bihar and Jharkhand, or Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. More recently, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh were declared Union Territories. Territorial reorganization is not unprecedented in India, to say the least.
While in some cases, statehood movements have coincided with armed struggles, the demand itself is not illegal or unconstitutional.
The Constitution does not prohibit people from advocating for new states. Article 3 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to create new states, alter existing state boundaries or change state names. The process does not require the concerned state’s consent, though the President must refer the proposal to the state legislature for its views. However, these views are not binding on Parliament.
Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld Parliament’s power under Article 3, making it clear that no state has absolute territorial rights.
In the 1960 case of Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, the Court ruled that while state legislatures must be consulted, their views do not limit the Parliament’s authority to reorganize states. In the 1963 case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India, the Court held that Indian states do not have sovereignty akin to federal units in the United States.
These legal interpretations make it clear that no state’s boundaries are permanent under the Constitution.
Kuki-Zo demand
Regarding the Kuki-Zo demand for separation from Manipur, it is rooted in the ethnic violence that began on May 3, 2023, and continues sporadically until today.
Allegations have been made that the state government under Singh not only allowed the violence but actively participated in and supported it. While this cannot be stated with certainty in official terms, prima facie evidence exists—news reports have documented sections of the state police accompanying mobs that attacked Kuki-Zo areas, and Singh has purportedly admitted to his role in the “Manipur Tapes,” leaked audio recordings attributed to him, which are under examination by the Supreme Court.
The divide in Manipur is now so deep that no Kuki-Zo individual, including high officials or police officers, can safely enter Imphal Valley, just as no Meitei, including officials, dares to enter Kuki-Zo-dominated hill areas. Even Kuki-Zo personnel in the central armed forces or the Army avoid Meitei areas. The central government itself has established buffer zones within the state, effectively acting as internal borders between the two communities.
At least 258 people have been killed while thousands of homes have been destroyed, displacing tens of thousands. Around 6,000 weapons were looted from state armories, mostly in the valley region, in the early days of the conflict, and most remain in the hands of extremist groups.
Therefore, the Kuki-Zo demand seems more understandable than COCOMI’s rhetoric, which, while strongly regionalist, does not openly call for secession from India. However, its rigid opposition to any division of Manipur risks being seen as defiance of the Indian state’s authority under Article 3 of the Constitution.
Asserting that Manipur’s territory is non-negotiable, regardless of parliamentary decisions, raises questions about whether this stance indirectly challenges Parliament’s constitutional power to reorganise states. This applies not only to COCOMI but also to Singh and Patra.
This article has been published in partnership with Newsreel Asia.
Vishal Arora is an independent journalist based in New Delhi, India, who covers Asia and beyond. He serves as editor of @Newsreel_Asia and is a board member of The Media Project. He’s written for many outlets including The Wall Street Journal, The Diplomat and The Caravan.