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(OPINION) On Sunday morning, a lightning offensive by Syrian rebels ended with the dramatic fall of Damascus, marking the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime after 13 years of devastating civil war.

This moment, one of the most consequential in the Middle East’s recent history, was set in motion by a chain of events that few could have anticipated — least of all Israel, whose own military campaigns inadvertently played a pivotal role.

The fall of Assad highlights a classic case of unintended consequences. Israel — like the West — was long ambivalent about the fate of the despotic Syrian regime, which was a bitter enemy, but a weakened one that seemed to have made peace with Israel’s usurping of the strategic Golan Heights.

One of the main reasons Assad was able to cling to power was the critical support he received from the Iran-backed Lebanese militia Hezbollah, which until recently was the largest non-state army in the world. It will take a while to understand exactly what happened in Syria, but it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Assad’s toppling came so quickly on the heels of Israel’s thrashing of Hezbollah in the recent Lebanon conflict. That shift almost certainly emboldened the rebels to make their move.

Israel now finds itself at a critical juncture. Its successes against Iran’s regional proxies have reshaped the regional balance, but they should not be heralded as an unqualified success: They are victories that have created new serious risks. To secure lasting benefits from this moment of upheaval, Israel must act decisively to stabilize Gaza, address the Palestinian issue, and forge a new regional order alongside Sunni Arab states.

In a sense, the roots of Assad’s collapse seem to trace back to Hamas’s catastrophic decision to invade Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. The brutal assault set off a war that upended the so-called “axis of resistance” led by Iran. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Ba’ath regime of Assad — key components of this alliance — have now been decimated, in what can only be described as a spectacular strategic failure.

In Gaza, Israel’s relentless campaign has systematically dismantled Hamas’s leadership and military capabilities, reducing the group to a scattered insurgency. Hezbollah, which escalated the conflict by opening a second front from Lebanon, has met a similar fate. Israel’s recent, decisive responses to Hezbollah’s year of rocket barrages on Israel’s north have left the group’s leadership decimated and its ranks of fighters significantly thinned.

Iran, the architect and financier of these groups, has suffered grievously as well. Israeli strikes on Iranian bases and assets in Syria and Iraq inflicted heavy damage, while Tehran’s inability to protect its proxies laid bare its vulnerabilities. The collapse of Assad, Iran’s key ally and the linchpin of its arms pipeline to Hezbollah, represents a further devastating blow to its regional ambitions.

And the consequences have extended beyond the Middle East — again to Iran’s detriment. The war fractured the Democratic coalition in the United States, as progressive and centrist factions — as well as Jewish and Muslim voters — clashed over President Joe Biden’s support for Israel (too little for some, too much for others). This division certainly assisted in President-elect Donald Trump’s election victory — a development likely to usher in a tougher U.S. stance on Iran.

For Israel, all this comes with a double-edged sword.

The dismantling of the Iranian axis represents a strategic triumph. Yet the ensuing risks are manifold. The rebel forces that now control Syria appear to be dominated by factions with troubling histories, including ties to al-Qaeda and other extremist groups — especially the most vocal group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. While the West’s focus on Assad’s atrocities led to a tacit tolerance of these rebels, their potential to transform Syria into a failed state — or, worse, an Islamist stronghold and terrorist haven — cannot be ignored.

Moreover, Assad’s collapse may trigger a power vacuum that invites rival powers, from Turkey to Russia, to assert influence in Syria, creating a new set of challenges for Israel. The chaos could spill over into Lebanon and Iraq, further destabilizing a region already on edge. Israel, for all its military might, cannot fully insulate itself from the ripple effects of a fractured Syria.

There will be voices within Israel celebrating the weakening of Iran’s axis as a historic achievement, but such triumphalism would be shortsighted. If Israel had a wise government — which, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it very much does not — it would seize the moment for a paradigm shift.

The most immediate challenge is Gaza. The war cannot drag on indefinitely without further eroding Israel’s international standing and risking greater instability. A sustainable resolution requires the swift return of hostages and the restoration of governance in Gaza, ideally to the Palestinian Authority with backing from Arab states.

Beyond Gaza, Israel has a unique opening to reshape the regional order. The fall of Assad weakens Iran’s grip on the Middle East, but enduring stability will depend on Israel forging alliances with Sunni Arab states. A grand coalition that includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates could serve as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions, fostering economic and security cooperation and representing a powerful statement against Iran’s chaos-driven agenda.

Forming such an alliance would be a way to tap into the intriguing opportunity presented by the presence of non-Islamist rebel factions amid the successful rebellion in Syria; some of them seek to establish a moderate, democratic Syria on the ruins of the Ba’athist dictatorship, and a few have even hinted at peace with Israel. Such voices would certainly be encouraged by a more pragmatic, less bellicose Israel, especially if the Jewish state proved itself capable of working smoothly with some Arab neighbors.

Israel can either seize this moment in a way that actually would mark a victory — or it can continue to drag on the Gaza war, imperiling the opportunity, because doing so is politically convenient for Netanyahu, allowing him to delay the inevitable accounting for the debacle of Oct. 7. That would not only compound the tragedy, but it would also risk the country being drawn into the chaos that inevitably follows the fall of a dictator.

This story was originally published in the Forward. Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.

Dan Perry is the former chief editor of The Associated Press in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books about Israel. Follow his newsletter “Ask Questions Later” at danperry.substack.com.