(ANALYSIS) Within the first few days of the full-scale war that Russian President Vladimir Putin launched in Ukraine on Feb. 24, Patriarch Kirill tepidly called for peace while calling the Ukrainians defending their territory — some who attend churches of the Moscow Patriarchate that Kirill leads — “evil forces.”

Seeing the devastation wrought by Putin’s forces in Ukraine, however, Orthodox priests connected with the Moscow Patriarchate and calling themselves “Russian Priests for Peace” wrote a statement against the war in the last days of February. The priests addressed “everyone on whom the cessation of the fratricidal war in Ukraine depends, with a call for reconciliation and an immediate ceasefire.”

Launching the movement between Last Judgment Sunday and Forgiveness Sunday, March 6, the priests said that they did not want to bear “the heavy burden of mothers’ curses” at the last judgment and that “there is no other way (forward) than forgiveness and mutual reconciliation.” Mourning “the trial that our brothers and sisters in Ukraine were undeservedly subjected to,” they said Ukraine’s people should determine their future “independently, not at gunpoint, without pressure from the West or the East.”

Their petition closed with 281 signatures on Forgiveness Sunday, two days after a new law was promulgated in Russia. On March 4, the Russian legislative body Duma passed and Putin signed legislation calling for harsh penalties for anyone making public statements that contradict government pronouncements on the “special military operation” in Ukraine or that disparage the Russian armed forces. Even calling the conflict a “war” or “invasion” rather than the state’s preferred “special military operation” is now against the law. Violators are subject to hefty fines and prison terms up to 15 years. Given this reality, Father Andrei Kordochkin, one of the originators of the anti-war statement who currently serves in Madrid, has said that for “any priest who lives in Russia (and signs) such a letter — it’s a sign of courage (and) an important event in his own life.”

Meanwhile, on Forgiveness Sunday, Patriarch Kirill used his sermon to justify the violence being committed in Ukraine — admitting only that conflict was taking place in the Donbas region — blaming it on “gay parades,” which are supposedly “the loyalty test … suggested by those who aspire to world domination.” For years leading up to this war, Kirill and some of his metropolitans have been fashioning an ideology that paints the Russian Orthodox Church as the world’s leader of traditional values, standing particularly against “homosexualism” and its perceived influence over Westerners, whom they perceive to be decadent and largely beyond saving. According to Kirill, the “Russian world” embodies traditional moral values and is “a special civilization that must be defended.” On March 13, a group of international Orthodox priests and scholars signed a declaration rejecting Patriarch Kirill’s “‘Russian world’ heresy” and the devastation it is bringing to Ukraine.

Orthodox priests were not the only believers in Russia to sign an anti-war statement. Around the same time the Russian Orthodox statement was distributed for signatures, several of Ukraine’s evangelical theological educators expressed deep disappointment to Russian evangelical leaders over their failure to speak out against Russia’s unprovoked attack. Among these Ukrainian evangelicals were Roman Soloviy — director of the Eastern European Institute of Theology, Lviv, and coordinator of research for the Euro-Asian Accrediting Association — and Taras Dyatlik, Eastern Europe and Central Asia regional director for United World Mission’s Overseas Council and Euro-Asian Accrediting Association director of education development.

At 6:03 a.m. on the sixth day of the war, an aggrieved Dyatlik wrote:

I openly address the leaders of the unions of Russia’s evangelical churches. Almost all of you know me personally or indirectly. If your unions remain silent at this time, you will be accomplices of a crime against humanity and guilty of the murder of the Ukrainian people and many of your brothers and sisters in Christ, singing praise songs louder than the cries and wailing of those being killed in Ukraine in the name of Putinism. You are afraid of prison. Your brothers and sisters in Christ in Ukraine — tens and hundreds of thousands — are afraid too, because they are being killed by Russian shells. …

Organizationally, you are believing the Kremlin and not believing your brothers and sisters in Christ. … Your unions congratulated Putin, thanked [him] for the freedom to believe. The time has come to make use of this freedom. … You officially remained silent in 2014. … Be faithful not to Putin. Be faithful to the Body of Christ. … And may the Lord give you the strength and wisdom to decide what to do next. … Forbid the members of your churches from watching Russian propaganda. And do not be silent. I am begging you on my knees.

Many Russian evangelicals responded negatively to this criticism, but not all. Nine evangelical educators and pastors took the matter to heart. They immediately drafted an anti-war “Appeal to Compatriots,” strongly opposing Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and requested fellow evangelicals to endorse it. By March 2, we received a copy that had gathered 81 signatures in its first day, a count that would reportedly reach up to 500 — mostly of the Russian Evangelical Christians-Baptists, with some Pentecostals and other Protestants.

The appeal, specifically calling out the killing of women and children and the bombing of hospitals and residential areas, did not mince words:

Our army is … launching bombs and missiles on the cities of our neighboring Ukraine. As believers, we assess what is happening as the grave sin of fratricide — the sin of Cain, who raised his hand against his brother Abel. No political interests or aims can justify the death of innocent people. … Today is the moment when each of us must call a spade a spade. We still have a chance to avoid punishment from above and prevent the collapse of our country. We must repent for what we have done, first of all before God and then before the people of Ukraine. We must reject lies and hatred. We call on the authorities of our country to stop this senseless bloodshed!

Such charged language exhibits extraordinary courage — in marked contrast to evangelical timidity previously under Putin. Dyatlik rightly considers the signers “heroes” who are “risking their families and their freedom.” With Putin’s newest draconian assault on freedom of speech on March 4, the initiators of the appeal quickly ended their collection of additional signatures, while Mirt Publishing House in St. Petersburg, which had originally posted the appeal, was forced to remove it from its website.

Challenging political authority in the manner of the evangelical appeal is unusual. It is true that believers from unregistered Evangelical Christians-Baptists and Pentecostal congregations complained vociferously of the violation of their human rights during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and frequently paid with imprisonment. Yet, speaking out on matters of the state has not been part of the wider evangelical tradition in Russia. Across seven decades of communism, the ever-present prospect of state retribution reinforced a posture of passivity. The post-Soviet period has witnessed growing Russian nationalism, Orthodox triumphalism and anti-Western xenophobia stoked by government-dominated media, which has only intensified since Putin’s highly contested 2012 presidential election. Russian evangelicals, because of their continuing close ties with European and North American coreligionists, must regularly endure newspaper and television slander questioning their patriotism.

In such a climate, the Russian evangelical movement’s leaders have felt obliged to display fulsome loyalty to their homeland and to Putin. For example, the Rev. Sergei Ryakhovsky, head of one of Russia’s two largest Pentecostal denominations, has energetically supported Putin and in turn has been rewarded with two state appointments: to the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations and to the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Despite this, even he made a statement to his fellow Pentecostals on Feb. 25 against the “fratricidal conflict,” using the word “war,” which he called “a terrible evil.”

For their part, at the 2014 Evangelical Christians-Baptists Congress, delegates gave a rousing endorsement of Putin just two months after the Kremlin engineered the formation of pro-Russian separatist “republics” in eastern Ukraine. Addressing Putin, the delegates said, “We express to you sincere appreciation for your labor in the post of president. … We reaffirm our principled loyalty with respect to state authority, based on the unchanged words of the Bible, ‘Let every soul be in submission to the higher powers’ (Romans 13:1).” The Congress also directly challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s pro-Western Maidan Revolution and its February 2014 overthrow of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich.

Who signed which statements against the war?

Since political statements by both Orthodox and evangelical Christians in Putin’s Russia are rare, the individuals who have signed each statement deserve study. Of the 281 known signers of the anti-war statement by Orthodox clerics, all are connected to the Moscow Patriarchate, including the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, which since 2007 shares canonical communion with the MP. Among the signatories are eight abbots (including one superior abbot currently based in Amsterdam), 21 monks (including five monk-deacons), 214 priests (including 94 archpriests), and 38 deacons (including five archdeacons). Unsurprisingly, no metropolitans or bishops in Russia signed the anti-war petition, though several metropolitans and bishops in Europe have made strong statements against the war. The initial 36 signatories, who can be thought of as originators — or at least initial signers — of the petition, are from Russia (19), Ukraine (two), Belarus (one), Kazakhstan (one), Western Europe (seven), the U.S. (two), East Asia (one) and the Middle East (one). We could not identify the location of two of the originators before publication.

At least 153 — just over 54% — of the signatories are currently serving in Russia, nearly half of whom are serving in Moscow and its province (50) or St. Petersburg and its province (26), but only five are from locations near the Ukraine border. Five serve with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP), at least one of which is now in a besieged location. More priests from Ukraine likely would have signed had they not been dealing with the pressing matters of caring for their parishioners’ suffering from the devastation of this war. Certainly, the number of priests in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church no longer commemorating Patriarch Kirill in the Divine Liturgy is increasing daily, and some priests are calling for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to cut ties with the MP.

Of particular note is the Belarus contingent: Of the 19 signatories from that nation, most had either actively resisted the government during recent protests against Lukashenko’s fraudulent election or tried to play the role of peacekeeper between their parishioners and government officials. Among others outside of Russia who signed, noteworthy are the six from the Netherlands; priests in Amsterdam have subsequently split from the MP over the war in Ukraine. Many of the 44 signatories currently serving in Western Europe were born and raised in Ukraine or Russia. Conspicuous in their absence are any signatures from the parts of Eastern Europe that have tied their sails to Patriarch Kirill’s ambitions to be the unequivocal leader of the Orthodox world, rather than Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Also represented are clerics serving in North America (15), East Asia/Oceania (four), the Middle East (two) and Latin America (one). The numbers presented here are all minimums, since our attempts to ascertain where all signatories are currently serving have not always been successful.

Among those who signed from Russia, the first known to have been arrested and fined for preaching an explicitly anti-war sermon was Father Ioann Burdin of the Orthodox Church of the Resurrection (Karabanovo, Kostroma Diocese). After his March 6 arrest, he remains defiant, declaring that, unlike the word “war,” nowhere in Scripture can he find the phrase “special military operation.” In an interview with independent Russian news outlet Meduza, Burdin discussed his position:

I finished (my sermon) saying you cannot allow hatred into your soul toward Russians, Ukrainians, Americans, or brothers nearby who do not think the way you do. If someone else’s pain and tears do not touch a person, then (that person) is not a Christian. … Right now, both Ukrainians and Russians are perishing there (in Ukraine). All of them are people. … Life is very short, but there is an eternity where borders, nationalities, (or) who you were during your lifetime … will have no meaning. What will have meaning is whether you were human or not.

A few other signers have participated in protests that have taken place across Russia in recent years. Many who signed this petition also signed an open letter condemning the brutal and unjust treatment of young protesters in Moscow in 2019, something that became known in Russia as “the Moscow affair.” Several instructors at theological academies and seminaries are among the signatories, as are many professional musicians. At least four signatories are veterans of military campaigns — one who served in Afghanistan, two who self-identify as veterans and one who previously served as a fighter pilot. Certainly, many of those signing from Russia will have served at least one year of compulsory military service, as required there.

The petition also includes some strange bedfellows. At least three priests are associated with the legacy of Father Alexander Men (1935-1990), and a handful associate themselves with controversial deacon Andrei Kuraev, who has made various antisemitic and anti-ecumenical statements against Men and his teachings. War against co-religionists in Ukraine, it seems, can motivate at least some priests to opposition, despite the vast majority of MP Orthodox leaders remaining silent in the face of war. Still, failure to protest does not necessarily equate with approval of the war. Although there has been a sharp conservative turn since 2012 among priests in Russia who have worked to prejudice their parishioners against the West and Ukraine, other priests work actively to move their parishioners toward love and greater tolerance.

As for the evangelical “Appeal to Compatriots,” it may have collected as many as 500 signatures, but the list of names by the time the online petition was closed down totaled 359. Of the nine who originated the appeal, eight are Evangelical Christians-Baptists and one is Pentecostal. By occupation, they include six theological educators — four administrators and two faculty — three pastors, and one publisher, all male. The nine hail from Siberia (four), the Russian Far East (two), European Russia (two) and the Caucasus (one).

For signers as a whole, 343 (95.5%) reside in the former Soviet Union — including a few from every Central Asian country, Georgia, Moldova, Ukriane, and Estonia — with only 16 (4.5%) from elsewhere. Russian Federation signers total 322 (nearly 90%), including 230 (71.4%) from European Russia and 92 (28.6%) from Siberia and the Russian Far East. As for major cities, Moscow (57) and St. Petersburg (37) account for 29.2% of the total from Russia. The next three cities with the largest representation are east of the Urals: Khabarovsk (18, 5.6%), Vladivostok (10, 3.1%) and Novosibirsk (8, 2.5%). With a well-known history as sites of exile for sectarians under both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Siberia and the Russian Far East have subsequently become locations for thriving and fairly independent evangelical communities.

Conversely, as noted by Nathaniel Davis in “A Long Walk to Church,” Orthodoxy east of the Urals has been relatively weak compared to European Russia; only 13 signers of the Orthodox petition are known to reside east of the Urals. Signers of the evangelical appeal from territories near Ukraine total 24 from 12 nearby cities, whereas only five Orthodox priests from four cities near Ukraine signed their anti-war petition.

Diversity of signers shown in number of women, denominations

The starkest demographic differences between the Orthodox and evangelical statements are gender composition and denominational diversity. The 127 women who signed the evangelical appeal constitute 35.3% of all who signed. Among the women who signed are one Baptist pastor, one Pentecostal pastor, several who co-lead youth and music ministries, one translator and radio broadcaster, several pastors’ wives — a few signing alongside their husbands and a few without their husbands — at least one small business owner and a handful of in-country missionaries. Despite pronounced patriarchal tendencies in Slavic evangelical communities, women in this part of the world have for decades led their congregations from within, almost always outnumbering men significantly.

The sheer number of female signatories indicates a strong lay presence. While the nine men who initiated the appeal are pastors and seminary instructors — and current and former national and regional denominational leaders and dozens of other pastors are among the signatories — several men who signed the appeal are part of the laity. They represent businessmen, coaches, musicians and authors. The number of women and laity reflects the longstanding Protestant conception of “the priesthood of all believers.”

The evangelical list also includes various denominational affiliations. The majority of signatories come from the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, with Pentecostals a distant second. Among ECB signatories, most are from the registered ECB Union, with smaller numbers from unregistered ECB congregations historically more resistant to state interference. Some signers are members of “free” churches and churches founded by Western missionaries in the post-Soviet era, as well as a few from smaller denominations not identified here due to their precarious position relative to the state. Some were oppressed or imprisoned during the Soviet period or are children or grandchildren of those who were oppressed. Not only do they consider the suffering they endured under communist rule a badge of honor, but their tribulations also inform their willingness to sign a protest petition at a moment when Putin’s authoritarianism has become abundantly clear.

As for theological emphases, both mainstream evangelical and more conservative and fundamentalist positions are represented. Likewise, some signers hold to Arminian, others to Calvinist theology. The list includes significant numbers of theological educators as well as  individuals associated with the longstanding German mission “Licht im Osten” (Light in the East).

Without naming names, a sampling of the voices of those who signed the evangelical appeal deserve to be heard.

• An educator: “We are in a very difficult situation right now. We are living in a world that we’ve never expected to live in, even though we’ve known Bible descriptions of the sinfulness of man and historical examples of that.”

• A high-ranking church official: “My heart is breaking into pieces. I wake up in a warm bed and cook myself a hot breakfast, and somewhere in Kiev (Kyiv) and Kharkov (Kharkiv), civilians die. I want to cry and weep, and somewhere in Moscow they are discussing how much the latest iPhone has become and how we will now live without Apple Pay. I am overwhelmed with sadness and anger, shame and guilt, and someone is gloating at what is happening in Ukraine.”

• A layperson: “The year 2022 has started with something that none of us could predict or imagine. The war initiated by the will of (the) Russian president came not only to Ukrainian homes; it wounded all of us. … We believe that Russia really needs repentance and … God’s forgiveness.”

How representative are the anti-war signers?

Russian Academy of Sciences religious studies scholar Roman Lunkin divides the reactions of Russia’s religious leaders to Putin’s war into three categories: 1) those who condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, relatively few in number, including the evangelical and Orthodox priests signing petitions; 2) a more numerous group that calls for peace but avoids assigning responsibility for the conflict, including several evangelical leaders and all Russian Orthodox bishops and metropolitans in Russia; and 3)those who feel obliged to support the war directly.

Thus, while the evangelical “Appeal to Compatriots” and the Orthodox priests’ petition are admirably principled and courageous, they unfortunately do not appear to be representative of Russia’s Protestant and Orthodox Christians in total. Most Protestant and Orthodox leaders are keeping their heads low and have so far remained silent on the Russian war against Ukraine. To their credit, unlike Patriarch Kirill, no evangelical leaders have issued ringing, enthusiastic endorsements for Putin’s unprovoked aggression.

Regarding the hesitancy of many Russian evangelicals to speak out, an incident that occurred the week prior to the invasion deserves note. Oleksandr Geychenko, rector of Odesa (ECB) Theological Seminary, participated in an effort of Eurasian evangelical educators to issue a condemnation of Russian preparations for war against Ukraine. But Russian evangelical representatives objected, preferring instead a statement focused solely on a prayer for peace.

The anti-war Orthodox and evangelical petitions are certainly commendable, but sadly, they represent a small fraction of their respective faith communities; the Moscow Patriarchate boasts more than 40,000 priests and deacons, and the Russian ECB Union has more than 1,600 congregations — most of which have at least one pastor. In the context of wider opposition to the war, Orthodox and evangelical anti-war efforts within Russia pale quantitatively compared to other civil society petitions and public protests.

In the face of  harsh penalties, tens of thousands of Russia’s 146 million citizens have gone into the streets across the country denouncing Putin’s war against Ukraine. As of March 20, police had arrested more than 15,000 protesters. In addition, nearly 3,000 students and faculty at St. Petersburg State University and more than 4,000 students and faculty at Moscow State University signed separate open letters opposing Putin’s warmongering. More than 8,000 scientists and journalists signed another open letter declaring that “war with Ukraine is a step to nowhere.” Topping these figures, over 18,000 cultural figures signed their own anti-war petition. And human rights activist Lev Ponomarev started an anti-war petition on change.org that had more than 1.2 million signatures by March 28. In addition, since Feb. 24, over 200,000 Russians have protested with their feet by leaving Russia.

Despite their small numbers, the Orthodox and evangelical anti-war statements represent those who grieve that this war is taking place. Based on our personal connections with believers in Russia, we would surmise that thousands of other believers would have signed such statements if they had a chance and that others agree with their spirit but have chosen not to sign for fear of retribution. Yet millions of people, especially those from the older generations, have succumbed to the propaganda of state-run media — and that will only become more pronounced with Russia’s clamping down on independent media sources.

Signs of deep tension are evident in the Christian churches of Russia. On social media, one can easily find Christians in Russia insulting each other for holding opposite views about what is actually taking place in Ukraine, prompting evangelical leaders to call for a cessation of such activity. One point is clear: The war that Putin has unleashed, which is threatening the life and limb of millions of citizens of Ukraine, is also fracturing the Christian communities of Russia — not only economically, but relationally. Only time will tell how Russian Christians weather this storm.

UPDATE & RESPONSE: We appreciate the feedback we have received about a few other evangelical and Orthodox leaders in Russia who made various statements in the lead-up to the war, in efforts to prevent bloodshed, and who have made additional anti-war statements since the appeals analyzed here were put forward. These statements – made by those who have and have not signed the appeals analyzed here – are important and ongoing. While readers may be able to find additional coverage of those statements elsewhere, April French and Mark Elliott have chosen not to name the authors of those appeals here, due to the danger they currently face.

April L. French, a doctoral candidate at Brandeis University, works at the University of Wyoming. She specializes in the religious history of the former Soviet Union, with interests in the theology and everyday life of believers during times of oppressive and repressive regimes. April has written, spoken and taught on evangelical and Orthodox Christianity, as well as Jewish history in the Soviet Union.

Mark R. Elliott, who holds a doctorate from the University of Kentucky, is a retired professor of European and Russian history. He served as editor of the East-West Church and Ministry Report for 25 years, 1993-2017, and now serves as editor emeritus. He is the author of “Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America’s Role in Their Repatriation” and “The Arduous Path of Post-Soviet Protestant Theological Education.”